

SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #2707-79/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 22 May with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report further to you.

William Parmenter
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Attachment
NFAC #2707-79

State Dept. review completed

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NFAC #2707-79

23 May 1979

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 7

USSR AND CUBA

Soviet analysts see the USSR as essentially cautious in Africa during the next few months. Given the SALT problem, they doubt whether Moscow would even press very hard the idea of a Patriotic Front government-in-exile for Zimbabwe. Indeed, they suspect that this may be an independent Cuban or African rather than a Soviet initiative. According to this view, however, the Soviets would continue to take their cue from the Frontline States in southern African matters and would support what the Frontline proposed. Thus, the idea of a Zimbabwe government-in-exile is certainly not dead, and could well be revived if circumstances seemed to call for it. Havana is seen to be also under pressure to be more low-key in its initiatives and psychologically on the defensive for the next few months, due to September's NAM meeting -- although the latest effusions of Carlos Rafael Rodrigues on Cuba's constricting role in Africa should be dismissed. This analysis does not bar further provision of anti-aircraft systems and experts for training to the Frontline, however, since these are already in the works. []

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

Analysts foresee no sudden new development in the capabilities of the Zimbabwe guerrilla forces, but there may be some increments to ZANU if unity talks with ZAPU succeed and ZANU thereby gains access to Soviet equipment. The development of an anti-aircraft capability in Zambia, mentioned above, is not seen as reaching a decisive stage before the end of summer, if then. On the side of the internal settlement, the view is that South African assistance to Rhodesia will remain carefully calculated despite the new and more aggressive-sounding emphases in South African policy. Botswana's basic position is not likely to change, but it will become more difficult as Rhodesian cross-border operations become bolder and ZAPU guerrilla movements increase (if in fact they do anytime soon). Re Namibia, analysts believe there is not much more SWAPO can do beyond a marginal increase in terrorist operations, particularly in view of the South

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**This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.*

Africans' moves to strengthen their military positions in the territory. In Angola, nothing new. [REDACTED]

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NIGERIA

The main worry of analysts is the potential Nigerian reaction to the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia by the US and/or the UK. While there is agreement that the Nigerians would be reluctant, for a variety of economic and political reasons, to retaliate against the US, their perception of their interests may not be ours, and they could find themselves backed into a corner. [Embassy Lagos believes on balance that the Nigerian government will not engage in an oil embargo against the US.] The reading on the transition to civilian rule, due in October, is still cautiously optimistic. [REDACTED]

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ZAIRE

The possibility of a renewal of activity by the ex-Katangans still worries analysts, and there is little likelihood that this problem will go away in the next few months, but we continue to have no real clues as to their movements or intentions. Given the absence of assurances on this problem, we are still concerned that the expatriate personnel in the Shaba mining complexes may withdraw at some point after the phased departure of the Inter-African Force, which is scheduled to begin at the end of June. [REDACTED]

UGANDA

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No fresh concerns have surfaced this month; the longer term problems of ethnic and political factionalism are still with us, as is the potential threat to Nyerere if the situation in Uganda should fall apart. [REDACTED]

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KENYA

Analysts note that the period between now and September, when general national elections are to be held, will be a time of tension as individuals and groups maneuver and plot against each other. Libyan money is in the field, but this kind of thing is not unusual in Kenyan elections. President Moi has done a good job so far at keeping the course steady. [REDACTED]

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HORN OF AFRICA

In the eyes of the specialists, the Horn generally appears to be lapsing back into familiar patterns following the traumas of the past two years. The French presence is steadying Djibouti, and we do not see new untoward developments there. [redacted] The Ethiopians appear, after the excursions re Sudan earlier this year, to be settling down to their guerrilla wars and to be suffering some remarkably high casualty rates as they do so. One mystery, cited by DIA: where is the Ethiopian air force? There seems to be a singular dearth of activity, given the amount of new equipment it has received and the role the air force could be playing in counterinsurgency operations. [redacted]

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SUDAN

While President Nimeiry's most pressing immediate problems are being met by outside help -- especially, it would appear, from the Saudis -- there has been no fundamental improvement in his situation. Analysts see Libyan President Qaddafi's preoccupation with other matters as one factor which is giving Sudan a breathing spell during the period immediately ahead. [redacted]

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CHAD

One of the Libyans' preoccupations is Chad, where the play is not going according to what we think is their script. Analysts are concerned that the chances are increasing of a genuine secession movement developing in southern (Christian, or at least non-Muslim) Chad, and note that the Nigerians are somewhat worried about a possible spillover of the Chad problem into their northern states. [redacted]

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MAURITANIA

This is still a very unstable country, under pressure both from external problems related to the Polisario struggle against Morocco and from what seem to be increasing manifestations of ethnic/racial tensions. We anticipate further troubles in the months ahead. [redacted]

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